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INTRODUCTION
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or rather its precursor, the
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, pioneered Marxist-Leninist
constitutionalism with the world's first Communist party constitution in
1918.' Since that time, and especially since the Second World War, the
Soviet Union had fallen behind its thirteen sister Socialist republics in
constitutional draftsmanship. 2 While the USSR was making do with its
1936 Stalinist constitution, the oldest fundamental law among the eight
Communist States of East Europe was the Czechoslovakian Constitution
of 1960, most of which was replaced by amendments in late 1968 and
after. 3 Of the five non-European Communist States, Vietnam's 1959
Constitution is the oldest 4 and presumably will be replaced soon. China
adopted a new constitution in 1975 and again in 1978. 5 In the Communist
world, the patina of constitutional age is not ideological virtue: constitu-
tional updating demonstrates social and economic mileage on the high
road to communism.
The Soviet Union lagged behind, in all probability, because of jur-
isprudential problems remaining from the Khrushchev era, and the conso-
lidations of the "return to normal" implemented under Brezhnev's lead-
ership. After some fifteen years of private and public debate, the new
Soviet Constitution was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on
1. J. TRISKA, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY-STATES 2-16 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
TRISIA]. In addition to the Russian Constitution of 1918, the Soviet Union has had three constitu-
tions: The First Union Constitution of 1924, the Stalin Constitution of 1936, and the new Constitution
of 1977.
2. For present purposes, it is assumed that there are fourteen states with Communist constitu-
tions. These are, to use their English common names: Albania, Bulgaria, China (The People's Re-
public of), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, Ru-
mania, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. See the similar list in PRAVDA, February 10,
1963, at 2, and TrisKA, supra note 1, at v. See also Brunner, The Functions of Communist Constitu-
tions: An Analysis of Recent Constitutional Developments, 3 REv. OF SOCIALIST L. 121 (1977). Some
commentators may wish to include Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia (Kampuchea), Ethiopia, Laos,
or South Yemen.
3. Brunner, supra note 2, at 121. Of the remaining seven countries, Bulgaria adopted a new
constitution in 1971, Hungary in 1972, Yugoslavia in 1974, Rumania in 1974, East Germany in
1974, Poland in 1976, and Albania in 1976. The Hungarian, Rumanian, East German, and Polish
constitutions were complete revisions rather than officially new organic instruments. See id. at
122-23.
4. Mongolia's constitution dates from 1960, North Korea's from 1972, and Cuba's from 1976.
Id. at 123.
5. The frantic pace of Communist constitution making is demonstrated by the resulting obsoles-
cence of a 1968 collection of the fourteen states' constitutions. Ten years after publication, only two
of the fourteen documents remained current. TRISKA, supra note I. Perhaps the most accessible
source of up-to-date constitutions is [1980] I-XV CoNsTIT-toNs oF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
(Oceana) [hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTIONS].
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October 7, 1977.6 Although this Constitution ought to be known as the
Khrushchev-Brezhnev Constitution, it is probably fated to be known as
the new Brezhnev Constitution, just as the 1936 constitution is commonly
referred to in Stalin's name. 7
Part I of this article will consider the 1977 Constitution in a general
manner, focusing on the debate over whether it represents an advance-
ment of the rule of law, or an embodiment of arbitrary party power. Part
II will focus on the validity of the Soviet model of federal republican
sovereignty. Throughout, the experience and constitutions of other na-
tions will be drawn upon for comparison and analysis. 8
I. LEGAL NORMS AND ARBITRARY POWER IN THE 1977
CONSTITUTION: AN OVERVIEW OF SOVIET
CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. Soviet Constitutionalism and the Evolution of Socialist Society
As with other Communist party states, a new Soviet Constitution is not
a confession of failure, nor an admission that the previous constitution
was deficient. 9 On the contrary, adoption of a new Communist party Con-
stitution indicates that the old has successfully guided a developing so-
cialist society onto a new and higher plane of evolutionary socialism. In
the more picturesque language of one recent commentator: "Every new
socialist constitution is a giant step toward that great graveyard of all con-
stitutions known as communism."
10
A new Soviet Constitution acknowledges progress since the adoption
of its predecessor, eliminates obsolete institutions, and institutionalizes
those mechanisms thought necessary to implement the next developmen-
tal stage. Thus, speeches made by Secretaries-General Stalin11 and Bre-
6. An English version of the new Constitution is available from Novos-n PEss AGENCY PUBLISH-
ING HOUSE (MOSCOW, 1977). English translations are also found in CURET DIGEST OF THE SovIEr
PREss, Nov. 9, 1977, at 1; XIV CONSTrrUInONS, supra note 5; 4 REv. OF SocmusT L. 57 (1978).
For accounts of the drafting process, see R. SHtRIur, THE NEw Sovier CoNsTITrnION OF 1977 2,
(1978).
7. See, e.g., B. Ramundo, The Brezhnev Constitution: A New Approach to Constitutionalism?,
13 J. oF INT'L L. & EcoN. 41 (1978).
8. For another interesting study of the 1977 Soviet Constitution, see Osakwe, The Theories and
Realities of Modern Soviet Constitutional Law: An Analysis of the 1977 USSR Constitution, 127 U.
PENN. L. Ray. 1350 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Theories and Realities of Soviet Constitutional Law).
9. An exception may be the Chinese Constitution of 1978, which was adopted only three years
after the previous one had been adopted.
10. OsAxwE, The Common Law of Constitutions of the Communist-Party States, 3 Ray. oF So-
uaA= L. 155,208 (1977).
11. J. STW4, ON mE DRAFr CON TrTUTON OFTHE USSR (1936).
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zhnev, 12 introducing the constitutions of 1936 and 1977, respectively,
both concentrated on the great strides made in Soviet political economy.
Stalin noted the economic changes in the USSR from 1924 to 1936, the
end of the quasi-capitalistic New Economic Policy, the elimination of the
surviving private industrial sector, and the liquidation of kulaks, traders,
merchants, and profiteers. 13 Being careful to use present active partici-
ples, Stalin claimed that a new class structure was evolving: "[The di-
viding line between the working class and the peasantry, and between
these classes and the intelligentsia, is being obliterated, while the old
class exclusiveness is disappearing. . . . [T]he distance between these
social groups is steadily diminishing . . . . [and] the economic
[and] . . . political contradictions between them are also subsiding and
becoming obliterated."1 4 Multinational fraternal cooperation within the
Soviet Union, of a degree unknown during the Revolution, was also as-
serted. 15
Brezhnev similarly listed the indicia of progress: the socialist economy
has matured; social changes have taken place in the working class, the
peasantry, and the intelligentsia; the republics have evolved, especially
those which "used to show an economic and cultural lag"; the growing
homogeneity of the three classes, and the fifteen republics, has resulted in
a "state of all the people"; and the hostile "capitalist encirclement" of
the USSR has ended. 16
In addition to acknowledging the progress of developed socialist soci-
ety, the new Soviet Constitution set the framework for its continued evo-
lution. Brezhnev's review of the main features of the draft emphasized
the strengthened constitutional position of the Communist Party; 17 the en-
hancement of Soviet Deputies' role; 18 the expansion of social, economic,
12. Brezhnev's Speech on Draft Constitution, CURRENT DIGESTOF THE SovIET PRESS, July 6. 1977.
at 6.
13. J. STALIN, supra note 11, at 7-16.
14. Id. at 14.
15. Id. at 16.
16. Brezhnev's Speech, supra note 12, at 6.
17. Id. at7.
18. Id. The elected term of deputies to the Supreme Soviet was extended from four to five years
(possibly to coincide with five-year plans). Compare article 36 of the 1936 constitution with article 90
of the 1977 constitution. The minimum age for electoral eligibility was reduced from 23 years to 18,
although in the final draft, 21 years was chosen as the minimum age for election to the USSR Su-
preme Soviet. Compare article 135 of the 1936 constitution with article 96 of the 1977 Constitution.
From 1936 until 1945, a deputy could be elected to the Supreme Soviet at age 18. The constitution
was amended de facto and the age was raised to 23 by a Decree (Ukaz) of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet in October, 1945, and apparently retrospectively ratified by a unanimous decision of
the newly elected Supreme Soviet in 1946 (which of course contained no deputies under the age of
23). This dubious constitutional practice is discussed in Nove, Some Aspects of Soviet Constitutional
Theory, 12 MoD. L. REV. 12, 17(1949).
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political and civil rights; 19 "[t]he further strengthening of socialist le-
gality and law and order";20 the drawing together of the nationalities; 21
the drawing together of the national economy;22 and the unprecedented
chapters on Soviet foreign policy and defense.2 3
As a symbol of the evolution of socialist society, much of the new con-
stitution cannot be interpreted in a strictly legal sense. For example, the
foreign policy chapters, which marked a clear departure from the Stalin
constitution of 1936, must be explained apart from their legal signifi-
cance. The substantive content of articles 28-30 (Foreign Policy) and
31-32 ("Defence of the Socialist Motherland") is elegant and elo-
quent. 24 Article 29 sets out ten basic principles of Soviet foreign policy:
(1) Sovereign equality with other states;
(2) Mutual renunciation of the use or threat of force;
(3) Inviolability of frontiers;
(4) Territorial integrity of states;
(5) Peaceful settlement of disputes;
(6) Non-intervention in internal affairs;
(7) Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;
(8) Equal rights of peoples and their right to decide their own destiny;
(9) Cooperation among states;
(10) Fulfillment in good faith of obligations arising from international
law and international treaties.2 5
Article 31 prescribes that the Armed Forces "be in constant combat readi-
ness, guaranteeing that any aggressor is instantly repulsed.' '26
There is little doubt that these provisions are not binding upon the So-
19. Brezhnev's Speech, supra note 12, at 7. With the Constitution's new emphasis on education
(article 49), health (article 42), housing (article 44), and culture (articles 46 and 72), Brezhnev em-
phasized that exercise of rights was associated with performance of duties, and that no right could be
exercised against the interests of the state. Id.
20. Brezhnev's Speech, supra note 12, at 8. Brezhnev here permitted himself a remark critical of
his predecessor.
We know, comrades, that some of the years following the adoption of the Constitution now in
effect were darkened by unlawful repressions and by violations of the principles of socialist
democracy and the Leninist norms of Party and state life. This was done in defiance of constitu-
tional provisions. The Party has resolutely condemned these practices, and they must never be
repeated.
Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. KoNsrrurs[A (Constitution), art. 28-32 (U.S.S.R.), reprinted in XV CONSTrrmoNs, supra
note 5 [hereinafter cited as KoNsTrursitA].
25. KoNsmTrursnA, supra note 24, art. 29.
26. KoNsrrtrrsA, supra note 24, art. 3 1.
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viet leadership. Action taken in violation of article 29's principles, such
as armed invasion of another state, would not be subject to judicial re-
straint, either in the form of declaratory or injunctive relief. 27 Assuming
that a Soviet citizen had enough information to draft a plea, assuming
further that plaintiff and counsel were not arrested for defamation and
weakening of the Soviet State, 28 and assuming still further that a court
would entertain the action, no relief could be forthcoming. Counsel for
the Soviet Government might suggest that such military activity was en-
couraged by article 30's reference to "comradely mutual assistance with
other socialist countries.' 29 Moreover, any remedy would be precluded
by article 73(8), which gives full and unlimited jurisdiction to Soviet
"authority and administration" to direct the Armed Forces of the
USSR. 30 The legal force of the statements of policy in article 29 is thus
undermined by other provisions and in that sense they are merely political
rhetoric, of no normative or legal value. Similarly, temporary occupation
of disputed border territory by units of the Chinese People's Army de-
monstrates that article 31 's instant repulsion clause cannot be taken liter-
ally, in spite of its significant symbolic value to a people who remember
German aggression. 3 1
27. It can be said that similar issues, concerning presidential war-making in Vietnam, have had a
day in court in the United States, if not in the United States Supreme Court. See Velvel v. Nixon, 415
F.2d 236 (1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 1042 (1970); McArthur v. Clifford, 402 F.2d 58 (1968), cert.
denied 393 U.S. 1002; Hart v. United States, 382 F.2d 1020 (1967), cert. denied 391 U.S. 956
(1968); Holmes v. United States, 387 F.2d 781 (1967), cert. denied 391 U.S. 936 (1968). See also
Velvel, The War in Viet Nam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable and Jurisdictionally Attackable, 16 KAN.
L. REv. 449 (1968); Note, Congress, the President and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81
HARV. L. REv. 1771 (1968); Symposium, Legalit. of United States Participation in the Viet Nam
Conflict, 75 YALE L. J. 1084 (1966).
To the author's information and belief, no law review article has been published in the Soviet
Union which questions the legality of the Czechoslovakian invasion or the peace time draft.
28. Law on the Criminal Responsibility for Crimes Against the State § 7, translated in 3 LAW IN
EASTERN EUROPE 75-76 (Z. Szirmai ed. 1959).
29. KONSTITUTSUA, supra note 24, art. 30.
30. Id. art. 73.
31. The constitutions of other socialist nations also make reference to the Soviet's foreign rela-
tions, but with differing perspectives. The East German (German Democratic Republic) Constitution
states that that nation "cultivates and develops, according to the principles of socialist international-
ism, mutual cooperation and friendship with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." VERFASSUNGEN
art. 6(2) (E. Ger.), translated in V CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5. A similar declaration of "indestruc-
tible friendship with the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" was made in the Preamble of the
1954 Chinese Constitution. FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS, CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 5 (1954). Other constitutions contain clauses which imply actual or possible Soviet aggression.
The Chinese Basic Law of 1978 refers to "countries subjected to aggression, subversion, interfer-
ence, control and bullying by the social-imperialist and imperialist superpowers." HsIEN-FA (Consti-
tution) Preamble (People's Republic of China), translated in III CONsTITUTIoNS, supra note 5.
A Chinese review of the Brezhnev Basic Law spoke more frankly about Soviet constitutional for-
eign policy:
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Several reasons explain the inclusion of the foreign policy, chapters.
First, no other document from the Brezhnev era will have the educational,
informational, and communicational value, both within the Soviet Union,
and internationally, as the 1977 Constitution. It is at once an historical
anchor for Brezhnev and his policies of peaceful coexistence, and an in-
strument of immense propaganda value. 32 Second, foreign policy state-
ments have appeared in all other recently adopted socialist constitutions,
and the Brezhnev model, which includes support for third world libera-
tion and peace through strength, reasserts Soviet leadership among
friendly socialist states. Third, the foreign policy chapters respond to less
than friendly constitutional attacks on Soviet foreign policy in hostile
Communist constitutions, such as China's 1975 Basic Law. 33 Fourth, as
Professor Hazard has written, "it has become customary, if not fashion-
able, for constitutional draftsmen to include a foreign policy state-
ment." 3 4 It may even be "psychologically necessary [since World War
II... to satisfy a state's own citizens and also governments of neighbor-
ing states that they can expect to live in peace. '35
The foreign policy chapters are thus declaratory of Soviet leadership of
the socialist commonwealth, and the Soviet Union's status as a super-
The history of Soviet social-imperialism is one of aggression, expansion, intervention and
subversion. With its truculence inflated after feverish arms buildup and war preparations, it oc-
cupied Czechoslovakia by force, attacked China's Chenpao Island, dismembered a sovereign
state on the subcontinent of South Asia by provoking a war, manipulated and meddled in the
affairs of the Middle East countries, employed mercenaries to commit armed intervention in
Angola, instigated mercenaries to invade Zaire and is intensifying its scramble for the control of
southern Africa and the Red Sea region. It poses a growing menace to the security of Western
Europe, occupies the northern territories of Japan and constantly levels threats of force at adjoin-
ing countries. Its warships cruise all the oceans. The whole world is thrown into unrest. This is
what Brezhnev's "policy of peace" and his assurances of "no threat," "non-interference" and
"non-aggression" amount to in reality.
Hsinhua Correspondent, Reactionary Essence of New Soviet Constitution, PEKING REv IEW, June 17,
1977, at 15, 28.
The 1978 Chinese Constitution may itself implicitly endorse expansionism with its "Greater
China" clause in the Preamble, which purports to unite "our compatriots in Taiwan, Hongkong and
Macao, and our countrymen living abroad." HsIEN-FA, supra.
Albania's Constitution of 1976 prohibits "the stationing of foreign military bases and troops" in
Albanian territory and prospectively declares illegal any occupation of its territory. KusrTErrA
(Constitution), arts. 93, 94 (Albania), translated in I CoNsrIUrToNs, supra note 5. Such clauses were
not found in the previous Albanian constitution. The Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 prohibits the
acceptance or recognition of any future "occupation . . . of Yugoslavia or any of its individual
parts." UsTAv (Constitution) art. 238 (Yugoslavia), translated in Appendix, CoNsTrrUnoN s, supra
note 5.
32. The word "propaganda" has a pejorative connotation in English not present in the Russian
word. A better term might be persuasive publicity.
33. See note 104 and accompanying text infra.
34. Hazard, Foreign Policy and the 1977 Soviet Constitution, 72 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 350, 352.
35. Id. at 350.
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power. They portray a nation having worldwide commitments, alle-
giances, friends, and enemies. Like other clauses in the Brezhnev Consti-
tution, such declarations would have been out of place and premature in
1936, and are an explicit hallmark of Soviet success in 1977.
B. Rhetoric and Ideology
Much of the new Constitution is "bombastic and boastful," 36 "empty
rhetoric and vague Articles,' ' 37 characterized by "[d]iffuseness of lan-
guage" 38 and "undefined terms," 39 wherein "legal precision gives way
to the requirements of . . . journalistic and political language," 40 pos-
sibly "written by Party hacks." 41 One should approach the Constitution,
however, in the context of Soviet and Communist constitutionalism. The
Soviet draftsman may intend his language to be educational, aspirational,
inspirational, imprecational, or merely declaratory.4 2 His prose is not al-
ways susceptible to the common lawyer's surgically precise statutory in-
terpretation, but the constitution ought not to be condemned on that basis
alone. 43
Political and ideological rhetoric is not unknown in western constitu-
tions. Consider, for example, the requirement that laws be conducive to
"peace, order, and good government," routinely used by British drafts-
men to limit the powers granted to colonial legislatures. 44 No Australian,
Canadian, or New Zealand statute, regardless of content, has ever been
voided for promoting "war, disorder or bad government.'" 45 In the
American Constitution, the general welfare clause, the privileges and im-
36. Kallistratova, Comments on the Draft Constitution, 27 CHRONICLE OF HUMAN RIcHTS IN THE
USSR 56 (1977).
37. Id.
38. Chalidze, Human Rights in the New Soviet Constitution, 28 CHRONICLE OF HUMAN Rlors IN
THE USSR 63 (1977). Chalidze's article also appears in 2 SovIEr LAW AFtER STALIN 67 (D. Barry, G.
Ginsburgs & P. Maggs eds.) (1978). The translation varies significantly in tone, as "party hacks" in
THE CHRONICLE becomes "party bureaucrats" in SoviEr LAW.
39. Chalidze, supra note 38, at 63.
40. Volpin, On the Constitution of the USSR, I PAPERS ON SoviEr LAW 52 (1977).
41. Chalidze, supra note 38, at 63.
42. See notes 11-23 and accompanying text supra.
43. Pious prose reaches new levels in the Chinese constitution of 1978, outreaching even the
Soviet draftsmen. HsIEN-FA (Constitution) (People's Republic of China) translated in Ill CONSTrru-
TIONS, supra note 5. China seeks "fraternal love among the nationalities," id. art. 4 and "adheres to
the general line of going all out, aiming high and achieving greater, faster, better and more economi-
cal results ... through self-reliance, hard struggle, diligence and thrift." Id. art. 11.
44. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., ch. 12, § 51; British
North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3, § 91; New Zealand Constitution Act, 1852, 15 & 16
Vict., ch. 72, § 53; South Africa Act, 1909, 9 Edw. 7, ch. 9, § 59.
45. See the discussion of cases in Queen v. Fineberg [1968] N.Z.L.R. 119.
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munities clause, and the Preamble might all be considered less meaning-
ful than rhetorical. Indeed, no empty Soviet rhetoric can be equated in
infamy with the puissant hyprocrisy of the early American constitutional
endorsement of slavery, the non-applicability of the Bill of Rights to a
race of slaves, or the slave-owner who could proclaim the self-evident
truth that all men are created equal. The Irish Constitution apparently is
grounded "[i]n the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all
authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and
States must be referred," 46 while the Samoan legislative capacity is "to
be exercised by the people of Western Samoa within the limits prescribed
by His commandments.' "47 Taking such piety at face value, the efficacy
of the Irish and Samoan constitutions is measured by its substance other-
wise, and the ideological piety of a Soviet Constitution ought not detract
from taking its legal measure.
Much of the Soviet Constitution is quite openly nonlegal symbolic ren-
dering of political principles, perhaps analogous to the United States'
Declaration of Independence. For example, the proletarian watchword
"He who would not work, neither shall heleat," does not mandate consti-
tutional starvation for the voluntarily unemployed. 48 Such slogans do not,
by themselves, destroy the substantive meaning of the entire document.
Americans in particular should remember that it is a constitution they are
interpreting, and a Communist constitution at that.
C. The Role of the Communist Party (CPSU)
Perhaps the most important development in the new Constitution, and
thus the most critical obsolescence in the 1936 constitution, concerns the
constitutional stature of the CPSU. 49 In the 1936 constitution, the CPSU
was mentioned only incidentally in a passing reference to the right to
unite in mass organizations, 50 and in its capacity, along with other organi-
46. BUNREA T NA HEIREANN (Constitution of Ireland) Preamble, reprinted in VII CONSTItUTIONS,
supra note 5.
47. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF EVsTERN SAMOA, Preamble, reprinted in XV
CoNsTrrunONS, supra note 5.
48. KONSTmrrsuA (Constitution) or 1936, art. 12 (U.S.S.R.), reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1,
at 38.
49. There was no mention of any party in the constitutions of 1918 and 1924. See KONSTITUTSIA
(Constitution) OF 1918 (U.S.S.R.); KONsTrruTsA (Constitution) or 1924 (U.S.S.R.). The CPSU orig-
inated as the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) in 1898, became the Russian Com-
munist Party (Bolsheviks (RKP(B)) in 1918, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks (VKP(B))
in 1925, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1952.
50. KONsTrTTsIA, supra note 24, art. 126.
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zations, as nominator of candidates for elective office. 5' In the new con-
stitution, " [t]he leading role of the Communist Party, the vanguard of all
the people, has grown." 52
Introduced early in 1977, article 6 provides:
The leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its
political system, of all state organisations and public organisations, is the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for the people and
serves the people.
The Communist Party, armed with Marxism-Leninism, determines the
general perspectives of the development of society and the course of the
home and foreign policy of the USSR, directs the great constructive work of
the Soviet people, and imparts a planned, systematic and theoretically sub-
stantiated character to their struggle for the victory of communism. 53
Western media focused attention, naturally enough, on this constitu-
tional sanctification of the CPSU, and drew a response from Brezhnev in
his October speech to the Supreme Soviet.54 "[The] bourgeois analysts..
. shout from the house-tops that [article 6] amounts to 'proclamation of
the dictatorship of the Communist Party', 'the primacy of the Party over
the State', 'a dangerous intertwining of the Party and government consti-
tutions', 'the obliteration of the boundaries between the Party and the
state.' "55 On one level Brezhnev rejected this criticism, by saying: "To
try to counterpose the Party to the peopld by talking about the 'dictator-
ship of the Party' is tantamount to trying to separate, say, the heart from
the whole of the body." 56 At the same time, however, the final draft was
amended to include words of limitation, apparently neutralizing the extra-
constitutional import of the first two paragraphs. The added third para-
graph of article 6 declares that "[a]ll party organisations shall function
within the framework of the Constitution of the USSR." 57 At least one
commentator has suggested that the proviso was "aimed at silencing"
Western criticism. 58
51. Id. art. 141. Compare the frequent references to the Chinese Communist Party in the Chi-
nese constitutions of 1975 and 1978. In 1978 there were nine references to the party, and in 1975
there were eleven. HsIEN-FA (Constitution) oF 1978 (People's Republic of China); HsIteN-FA (Consti-
tution) OF 1975 (People's Republic of China).
52. KONSTITUTSIIA, supra note 24, Preamble.
53. Id. art. 6.
54. Brezhnev, On the Draft Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the USSR and the Results of its
Nationwide Discussion, XV CONSTITUTIoNs, supra note 5.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. KONSrtrnsHA, supra note 24, art. 6.
58. Luryi, The New Constitution of the USSR from Draft to Laws: An Analysis of the Changes
Adopted, 2 SOViET LAW AFTER STALIN 35, 39 (D. Barry, G. Ginsburgs & P. Maggs, eds. 1978).
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Although the CPSU is not expressly given a monopoly on party activity
in the USSR, and the third paragraph of article 6 denotes a multiparty
function, other provisions, by implication, effectively exclude rival, non-
Communist, party organizations. Article 51 grants citizens "the right to
associate in public organisations" but such groups must promote their
political activity "[iln accordance with the aims of building commu-
nism." 5 9 Organizational activity cannot "be to the detriment of the inter-
ests of . . . the state",60 and organizational behaviour cannot be sepa-
rate from citizens' duties and obligations to the state. 61 In addition, the
CPSU is declared the nucleus ("yadro") of the political system and all
state and public organizations, 62 which might suggest that an independent
trade union, a league for immigration rights, the Moscow chapter of
Amnesty International, or Helsinki Watch can function as public organi-
zations only with a CPSU nucleus. 63
Western criticism of the constitutional preeminence of the CPSU is fre-
quently strident or cynical, and usually suggests that such preeminence
renders the constitution less constitutional. 64 Open confirmation of party
political power in the Brezhnev Constitution is asserted to be a "scandal-
ous and overt contradiction" 65 between article 6 and the articles which
proclaim a "state of the whole people" 66  in which "[a]ll
power . . .belongs to the people" 67 based on "the electiveness of all
bodies of state authority . . . [and] their accountability to the peo-
ple." 68
In one respect, such criticism misses the point. Condemning the Soviet
Constitution for operating under the aegis and imprimatur of the CPSU is
like criticizing France on the grounds that it is excessively French. 69 The
supremacy of the party should properly be regarded as the grundnorm of
the Soviet political structure, a fact no more mysterious than the unwrit-
ten British grundnorm of absolute parliamentary sovereignty. In this
sense, article 6 is welcome as a recognition of actual political practice. It
"openly confirms and reinforces the defacto situation in which the lead-
59. KONSTITUTSIIA, supra note 24, art. 51.
60. Id. art. 39.
61. Id. art. 59.
62. A literal translation of the Russian text would be "the nucleus of its political system, state
and public organizations." The word "all" was added to the English version.
63. See Chalidze, supra note 38, at 71; Luryi, supra note 58, at 40-41.
64. See, e.g., 224 THE NATION 741 (1977).
65. Kallistratova, supra note 36, at 56.
66. KONsTrnrrSIIA, supra note 24, art. 1.
67. Id. art. 2.
68. Id. art. 3.
69. The figure of speech is taken from Volpin, supra note 40, at 52.
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ership of the CPSU decides all political, economic, and international
questions."70
In Western constitutions, one looks in vain for recognition of party dy-
namics. The founding fathers of the United States, for example, made no
effort to circumscribe party activity by constitutional means. There can be
no doubt that the prescription for choosing an American president found
in article II and the twelfth amendment bears only a superficial resem-
blance to the actual political process. Surely the Soviet Constitution ought
not to be criticized for its greater candor in recognizing party existence.
Nonetheless, the Constitution legitimates ad hoc party prerogative and
facilitates political expedience by clothing partinost (party orientation) in
fakonnost (legal orientation). 71 It does signal continued and increasing
application of legal norms to institutional behaviour and individual rela-
tions. 72 At the same time, however, Stalin's dictum that "the withering
away [otmiranie] of the State will come not through the weakening of the
power of the State, but through its uttermost strengthening," remains op-
erative. 73 The Brezhnev Constitution lends internal steel reinforcement to
concrete party rule, and thereby enables the dialectic "socialist legality"
to serve in harness. Constitutional recognition of the party emphasizes
that while the constitution may be a milestone on the high road to commu-
nism, the road map for future travel is to be found not in the Constitution,
but in the party program of the CPSU. 74
70. Kallistratova, supra note 36, at 57.
71. Partinost complements zakonnost with Brezhnev's dual role of President of the USSR and
General Secretary of the CPSU.
Another indication of the increasing significance of fakonnost is the recent expansion of the num-
ber of Soviet law schools. See Osakwe, The Common Law of Constitutions of the Communist Party-
States, 3 REv. OF SOCiALIST L. 155, 209 (1977).
72. Many of the changes made in the 1977 Constitution Imay be "cosmetic," but cosmetology
has substance. For example, the articles on civil and social rights, found in chapter ten (out of thirteen
chapters) in the 1936 constitution, have been promoted to the front of the new Constitution. A simple
reordering may have no significance in strict statuatory construction, but it must have meaning. Most
Americans would intuitively agree that the "first" amendment has a primacy, a certain pre-emi-
nence, which might be lost were freedom of speech renumbered, and surely the sense of urgency
would be lessened if the first amendment were "article I, section 9, clauses 4, 5, and 6."
Another change is the increased length of the new Constitution, with 174 articles instead of 146,
nearly twice as much prose, and an extensive preamble. The criterion of size is offered as prima facie
evidence, admittedly slight, of the increasing usefulness of legal norms-if not absolute adherence to
the rule of law-for the rulers of the Soviet state.
73. Nove, Some Aspects of Soviet Constitutional Theory, 12 MODERN L. REv. 12, 14 (1949)
quoting STALIN, LENINISM (10th ed. 1947).
74. It may also be appropriate to recall that the Party itself is monolithic. As early as 1919. the
program of the Russian Communist Party left no doubt about regional party autonomy:
The Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Byelorussia exist at the present time as individual Soviet
republics. This is how the question of the forms of State structure has been decided for the
Vol. 55:505, 1980
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D. Individual Rights
The political utility of expedient fakonnost is best exemplified by part
II, chapters 7 and 8 of the 1977 Constitution, entitled "Equality of Citi-
zens' Rights" and "Basic Rights, Freedoms, and Duties of Citizens of
the USSR." These chapters guarantee political and civil rights, as well as
rights to employment, rest and leisure, health, old age, disability and
sickness benefits, housing, education, cultural benefits, sexual equality,
and family protection. 75 Officials and all state organs, for the first time,
are directed to have respect for the individual and to protect the rights and
freedoms of citizens. 76 Citizens are guaranteed the right to criticize offi-
cial shortcomings without persecution. 77 Enforcement mechanisms and
remedies are also created, and citizens may lodge a complaint, appeal to a
court, and receive compensatory (not punitive) damages in appropriate
cases.
78
All of the above rights, however, are subject to conditions precedent or
subsequent. No legal right or remedy may be exercised or sought "to the
detriment of the interests of society or the state" 79 and any exercise of
legal rights is dependent upon performance of duties and obligations. 80
In addition, the rights and remedies are not self-executing; they are
dependent upon Union or Republican legislation for their meaning. Com-
plaints are to be examined according to procedures and within time limits
present. But it does not in the least mean that the Russian Communist Party should in turn
reorganise itself on the lines of a federation of independent Communist Parties.
The Eighth Congress of the [Russian Communist Party] decrees: it is necessary that there exist
a single centralised Communist Party and a single Central Committee to direct the entire work of
the Party throughout all the parts of the RSFSR. All decisions of the [Russian Communist Party]
and its directing organs are unconditionally binding on all branches of the Party, irrespective of
the national composition. The Central Committees of the Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian Com-
munists enjoy the status of regional committees of the Party, and are wholly subordinted to the
Central Committee of the [Russian Communist Party].
Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice 27 (R. Conquest ed. 1967).
75. KONSTITrsI A, supra note 24, arts. 34,35, 36,40,41, 42,43, 44,45, 46,53.
76. Id. art. 51. Complaints are to be examined according to procedures and within time limits
established "by law," id. art. 58; appeals to a court may be "in the manner prescribed by law," id.;
trials must be open to the public, except "in cases provided for by law," id. art. 157; damages are
available as compensation for "unlawful" actions of officials and state organs, id. art. 58; officials
may not enter a home "without lawful grounds," id. art. 55; privacy of conversations and correspon-
dence is protected "by law," id. art. 56. While no one may be arrested except on a warrant, id. art.
54, an individual may be held for 2 months "confinement under guard" for preliminary investigation
without counsel, until the investigation is complete. RSFSR UGOL KOD (criminal code) arts. 47, 97
(1960).
77. KONstITrTs1A, supra note 24, art. 49.
78. Id. art. 58.
79. Id. art. 39.
80. Id. arts. 59-69.
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established "by law." 81 Appeals to a court may be "in the manner pre-
scribed by law." ' 82 Trials must be open to the public, except "in cases
provided for by law". 83 Damages are available as compensation for "un-
lawful" actions of officials and state organs. 84 Officials may not enter a
home "without lawful grounds." 85 No one may be arrested except on a
warrant, but custodial interrogation does not amount to "arrest. "86 Pri-
vacy of conversations and correspondence is protected "by law. "87
Thus if the "right" in question is employed as a sword-as the basis of
plaintiff's cause of action to secure a legal entitlement-the action may
be defeated because no cutting edge has been provided by enabling legis-
lation; if the right is employed as defendant's shield-to ward off crimi-
nal prosecution-it may not be proof against asserted state and societal
interests. The Constitution, and the rights it confers, are the creatures of
the legislators, and not vice versa.
The dialectic of legal norms and arbitrary power one finds in consider-
ing the role of the CPSU is equally apparent when considering such con-
stitutional rights. One school of Western critics perceives evolutionary
growth in Soviet legality, analogous even to recent American develop-
ments:
More and more [Soviet dissidents] appeal to the fights granted them by
the constitutions allegedly guiding their political systems. Like the civil
rights movement [in the United States], which began by asserting fights
which full citizens take for granted (like being served a bowl of soup at a
drugstore lunch counter), the liberal-radical protest movement (if one can
speak of a movement) in the communist world has begun to insist on the
actual exercise of rights formally granted by exisiting laws. Indeed. the ap-
peal to formal norms of the polity, the insistence on adherence to rules,
laws, and constitutions, in short, the legalism and constitutionalism of the
dissenters is the trait in the pattern of Soviet and East-European protest phe-
nomena most likely to impress the foreign observer. 88
As the well-known translator Max Hayward 89 wrote in an introduction to
81. Id. art. 58.
82. Id.
83. Id. art. 157.
84. Id. art. 58.
85. Id. art. 55.
86. Id. art. 54. See note 76 supra.
87. KONSTITUTSIIA, supra note 24, art. 56.
88. Meyer, Political Change through Civil Disobedience in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Po-
LITICAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATION 421, 436 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman, eds. 1970).
89. Translator of Pasternak, Sinyavsky, Solzhenitsyn, Babel, Amalrik, Mandelstam, and many
others and editor of ON TRIAL: THE Soviur STATE VERSUS "ABRAM TERTZ' AND "NIKo.AI ARZHAK'
(1967).
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Andrei Amalrik's Involuntary Journey to Siberia: "[I]t is rarely effective
to resist the encroachments of a bureaucratic police state in the name of an
idea, or on the basis of moral indignation. It does make sense, on the
other hand-and not merely as a last despairing, existentialist gesture-
to study the rules and regulations, and quote them at one's persecu-
tors." 90
Another school of thought remains skeptical, and declares that the ex-
tra-constitutional party program and extra-legal executive convenience
prevail:
[P]olitical expedience may usurp formal legality in the relationship of state
to citizen if it is deemed necessary. An ad hoc legal policy, then, tailored to
'fit' a lone individual or a small group... is the quintessence of a preroga-
tive act.
[T]he new Soviet Constitution incorporates most of the caveats on the
relation of citizen to state from the 1936 Constitution (and adds several
more), which will continue to facilitate and now even more formally legiti-
mate the regime's resort to ad hoc legal policy in political cases." 91
Each school of thought-that characterized by optimistic faith in rule
of law, and its opposite, characterized by cynical appreciation of arbitrary
party rule-will find support in the new Constitution. It is at once more
legalistic and, simultaneously, more communistic. But as Hayward con-
cluded: "It remains to be seen whether. . . 'juridical norms' can become
the main cohesive force in a society that for too long was held together
only by terror." 92
II. FEDERALISM
"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is an integral, federal, multi-
national state ......
-1977 Constitution, article 7093
"[The so-called federalism in the 1977 Soviet Constitution is] typical
great-Russian chauvinism and forced Russification of non-Russian na-
tions and nationalities."
-Hsinhua Correspondent. 94
90. Hayward, Russia, Dissent, and the Rule of Law, 33 A CHRONICLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
USSR 37 (1979).
91. Sharlet, Legal Policy under Khrushchev and Brezhnev: Continuity and Change, 20 LAW IN
EASTERN EUROPE 319,326 (1978).
92. Hayward, supra note 90, at 38.
93. Kor snrrsi[A, supra note 24.
94. 25 PEKING REviEw, June 17, 1977, at 13.
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The Soviet Union is a self-proclaimed federal system, with fifteen al-
legedly autonomous federal republican units making up the Union. The
object of this part is to assess the validity of that federalist assertion,
within the general context of Soviet constitutionalism. 95 Section A will
briefly survey the general characteristics of federal, quasi-federal, and un-
itary states as an introduction to consideration of the federal aspects of the
Soviet Union of Republics, which are described in section B, and evalu-
ated in section C.
A. The Characteristics of Federalism
Federal systems can originate in one of two ways, or in a combination
of the two ways: (1) pre-existing colonies or states, each with its own
identity, may be united by peaceful agreement or military conquest; (2) a
previously undivided (perhaps undeveloped) whole may be subdivided.
Examples of the former (which would likely retain pre-union identity)
include the Union of South Africa, 96 the Dominion of Canada, 97 the
Commonwealth of Australia, 98 and the American colonies-under both
the Articles of Confederation and the United States Constitution. Exam-
ples of the latter (which ought to be more susceptible to centralization)
95. For a general discussion of problems of federalism in the Soviet Constitution see Theories
and Realities of Soviet Constitutional Law, supra note 8, at 1406-10.
96. The South Africa Act, 1909, 9 Edw. 7, ch. 9, united the former Boer colonies of the Orange
Free State and Transvaal (both of which were landlocked) with the British Natal and Cape of Good
Hope colonies. The four former colonies became provinces of the Union of South Africa, but provin-
cial laws were void if repugnant to a union law, id. § 86, and the union had full "peace, order, and
good government" powers. Id. § 59. The union was not a true federal system. See R. HYAM, BRI-
TAIN'S IMPERIAL CENTURY 293-317 (1976).
97. The British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. ch. 3, united the colonies of Canada
(Upper and Lower Canada became Ontario and Quebec respectively), Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick. Section 91 gave the Dominion "peace, order, and good government" powers excepting
only those subjects assigned exclusively by § 92 to the provinces.
98. The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64, Vict. ch. 12, united the
colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, Tasmania, and Western Aus-
tralia, id. § 3, leaving New Zealand the option to join the Commonwealth. Id. § 6. The Com-
monwealth Parliament was given "peace, order, and good government" powers in express terms. Id.
§51.
Vol. 55:505, 1980
Soviet Constitution: Commonwealth Perspectives
include New Zealand, 99 Brazil, 1°° Mexico, 101 and the territorial expan-
sion of both the United States 102 and Canada. 103
A federal system is subjected to both centrifugal and centripetal forces.
A true federal system-one capable of resisting both a collapse around
the gravitational center and a disintegration into its component parts-has
two opposing attributes. On one hand, the federal center, symbolized by
Ottawa, the District of Columbia, and the Australian Capital Territory,
must have some legislative-executive powers not shared by the state or
provincial components. 104 To prevent the states from flying out of orbit,
the federal powers must not be subject to provincial nullification, either
by legislative means or by secession. An example of a federation where
the member states have had such powers is Malaysia. 105 The Canadian
record is not complete. The present federal government of Canada may
99. The New Zealand Constitution Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict. ch. 72, created six provinces but, as
in the case of South Africa, the central government was given plenary "peace, order, and good
government" powers; the provinces were abolished in 1875. Abolition of the Provinces Act, 1875
(N.Z.).
100. See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil, October 17, 1969, in II CONSnTruroNs,
supra note 5. Article I describes Brazil as "a federative republic, constituted... by the indissoluble
union of the states, the Federal District, and the territories." Id. See also Haring, Federalism in Latin
America, THE CoNsTrrnoN RECONSIDERED 341 (C. Read ed. 1968).
101. See Constitution of Mexico, 1917, in IX CONSTrrutONS, supra note 5. Article 40 established
"the will of the Mexican people to organize themselves into a federal, democratic, representative
Republic composed of free and sovereign States in all that concerns their internal government, but
united in a Federation established according to the principles of this fundamental law." Id.
102. It can be argued that the Western States did not join the union "on an equal footing" with
the Eastern States. Alaska, for example, had to "forever disclaim all right and title" to all territory
within its borders owned by the federal government, a condition not imposed on eastern states. See
ALAsKA CONsT. art. XII, § 12; Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 4, 72 Stat. 339 (1958).
103. Six provinces were added to the Dominion of Canada between 1870 (Manitoba) and 1949
(Newfoundland). British action was necessary in each case, being either an order in Council under
the terms of Section 146 of the British North America Act, 1867, 9 Edw. 7, ch. 9, or a new statute.
104. It is suggested that effective institutional review of power sharing is a sine qua non of a
genuine federal system. If such review is not expressly provided for in a constitutional document, it
must evolve by implication, or the federal system will disintegrate or implode. The judiciary is the
institution which most naturally can assume such a role. Supervision of fundamental rights is secon-
dary, both in importance and evolution. Once accustomed to finding legislation outside the constitu-
tional allocation of power, a bench and a bar can move more easily to scrutiny of legislation in terms
of fundamental rights. Absence of such institutional review is a hallmark of a loose amalgamation of
states, a unitary state, or a pseudo-federal unitary state.
An example of an institution expressly created to oversee federal relations is the constitutional
court of Yugoslavia. UsTAv (Constitution) art. 375 (Yugoslavia), translated in Appendix, CONSTnTU-
"MONS, supra note 5.
105. Singapore, North Borneo, and Sarawak joined the Federation of Malaya (called Malaysia)
in 1963. Malaysia Act, 1963, c. 35. Singapore later seceded from Malaysia and became an indepen-
dent member of the British Commonwealth. Singapore Act, 1966, ch. 29. See also 6 HALSEURYS
LAws OF ENGLAND 442, 459-60 (4th ed. 1974).
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yet face some test of provincial sovereignty. 106 There is no clear language
in the United States Constitution, although presumably a defacto solution
was provided by the Civil War. 107
On the other hand, the states or provinces, to resist the gravitational
pull of centripetal forces, must have some constitutional integrity-some
kernel of power-not susceptible to occupation by the center. The New
Zealand provincial system, 1852-1875, was a defective federal scheme,
wherein the provinces lacked a constitutional power-sharing frame-
work.108 The Canadian federation, while confronting Quebecois separa-
tism, may simultaneously be endangered by excessive centralization
through the disallowance power.' 09 The British Empire, or Com-
monwealth, can also be considered a federal entity, albeit subject to a
continuing political process of disintegration, but in constitutional theory
susceptible to absolute rule from the parliamentary center. 110 Devolution
106. See Matas, Can Quebec Separate? 21 McGILL L. J. 387 (1975); Greenwood, The Legal
Secession of Quebec-a Review Note, 12 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 71 (1978). A test of provincial
power to secede from the federal union was recently averted when Quebec citizens voted down a
proposed secession measure.
107. The only de jure hint in the text of the United States Constitution is the preamble, wherein a
drafting committee's first draft beginning "We the people of the states of New Hampshire, Massa-
chusetts, [etc.]... " was replaced with "We the people of the United States .... See C. Rossrri,
1787-THE GRAND CONVENTION 196-219 (1966). See generally Bestor, Respective Roles of the Sen-
ate and President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties-The Original Intent of the Framers of
the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L. REv. 1, 19 (1979); VIRGINIA COMMISSION ON
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, WE THE STATES (1964), a collection of states' rights documents. See
also the prohibition on states entering into any treaty, alliance, confederation agreement, or compact.
U. S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, 3. This prohibition was interpreted to deny the Confederation of
Southern States "any legal existence." Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 182 (1878); E. CORWIN,
THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 138 (14th ed. H. Chase & C. Ducat 1978).
108. The New Zealand Constitution Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., ch. 72. All provincial legislation
was subject to "[d]isallowance" by the Governor. Id. § 29. The provincial Superintendent was
obliged to follow gubernatorial instructions, id. § 31, and there were no provincial spheres from
which the central government was barred. By contrast, there was an extensive list of powers exclu-
sive to the central government. Id. § 19. Sections 19, 29, and 31 were among those sections of the
Act repealed in 1892. The Statute Law Revision Act, 1892, 55 & 56 Vict., ch. 19.
109. See Wilson, Disallowance: The Threat to Western Canada, 39 SASK. L. REV. 156 (1974-
75).
110. The plenary legislative powers and responsible self-government granted to Australia, Can-
ada, and New Zealand, for example, repose today in the British statute books and could, in theory, be
repealed by the United Kingdom Parliament. See notes 16, 97-99 supra. The Statute of Westminster.
1931, 22 Geo. 5, ch. 4, commonly referred to as a Commonwealth independence act, is itself a
British statute, and may be repealed in the ordinary fashion by Parliament.
Both Canada and Australia would need British statutory assistance to adjust their federal-state bal-
ance. New Zealand, whose legislative capacity is still derived from the 1852 Constitution Act
("[tihere shall be within the colony of New Zealand a General Assembly .... " The New Zealand
Constitution Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., ch. 72) was unable to abolish its moribund second chamber
until enabling legislation was passed by the United Kingdom. New Zealand Constitution (Amend-
ment) Act, 1947, I1 Geo. 6, ch. 4; Legislative Council Abolition Act, 1950, 7 REPR. STAT. N.Z. 829.
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of power within the Empire is not a perfected process and is continuing in
Malaysia, 11 the West Indies, 112 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, 113 and Great Bri-
tain itself. 114 Perhaps the best evidence of a viable federal system, with
areas of exclusive concern for both the federal center and the provincial
units, is the continuing tension, if not litigation, over marginal or innova-
tive legislative domains.
B. The Model of Soviet Federalism
The first union of socialist states was solemnized in January 1924, al-
though the engagement was sealed in December of 1922 and the constitu-
tion of the combined republics was put into effect, provisionally, on July
6, 1923 by Central Committee decision. 115 The Ukraine, Byelorussia
(White Russia), Russia (RSFSR), 116 and Transcaucasia (itself an artificial
federation of Armenia, Azerbaidzhan and Georgia) declared the grund-
norm of their union to be "[t]he will of the peoples of the Soviet Repub-
lics, unanimously proclaimed at their recent Soviet Congresses.... ,"117
The Declaration of Union, section one of the Constitution, anticipated
the evolutionary atrophication of the republican powers by forecasting
"the union of the toilers of all countries into one World Soviet Socialist
Republic."' 1 8 The union was granted exclusive powers in numerous
areas. 119 Article two abolished republican citizenship and created union
111. Malaysia Act, 1963, ch. 35.
112. British Caribbean Federation Act, 1956,4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 63.
113. Rhodesia's 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (U.D.I.) was never accepted by
British courts. See Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1969] 1 A.C. 645,656.
114. It seems likely that increasing federal powers will be given to regional legislatures in Scot-
land and Wales. See Scotland Act, 1978, ch. 51, and Wales Act, 1978, ch. 52.
115. The "Central Committee" referred to here is the indirectly elected bicameral legislature
created by the 1924 Constitution, not the CPSU Central Committee. See KoNsrrrtUrslTA (Constitution)
of 1924, art. 4, reprinted in TRisKA, supra note 1, at 21-23.
116. In 1924 Russia was called the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. KoNsrrrursIA
(Constitution) of 1924, § 2 (Covenant), reprinted in TRiSKA, supra note 1, at 18. In 1936 and 1977, it
was called the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. KoNsrrrustlA (Constitution) of 1936,
art. 13, reprinted in TRIsKA, supra note 1, at 38-39; KONsTrurslIA, supra note 24, art. 71.
117. KoNsrrrrrsuA (Constitution) of 1924, § I (Declaration of Union), reprinted in TRISKA, supra
note 1, at 18. As in the preamble to the United States Constitution, the draftsman sought legitimacy in
the will of the people, not in the agreement of political units.
118. Id.
119. KoNsrrrUtrsA (Constitution) of 1924, § 2, art. 1, reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1, at
18-20. The Union was given exclusive authority over foreign affairs, foreign trade, treaties, war and
peace, the armed forces, all domestic and foreign borrowing by the republics, economic planning,
internal trade, the post office, transportation, communications, all republican budgets, taxes and rev-
enues, currency, credit, principles of land use, principles of exploitation of minerals, forests, and
waterways, inter-republican movement, labor law, principles of education, health, and weights and
measures, civil codes and criminal codes, civil procedure and criminal procedure. Id.
Washington Law Review
citizenship. 120 Separate sovereignty, and the right to freely withdraw,
however, was guaranteed each of the four republics, in express language,
in the Declaration of Union 121 and in article two of the Covenant. 122
Republican membership in the union soon expanded, although Soviet
territory did not. Three new republics were carved out of central Asian
lands of the RSFSR (Uzbekistan and Turkmenia in 1925 and Tadzhikistan
in 1929) and the four became seven.
All mention of the covenant, or any contractual theory of union, was
omitted in the 1936 constitution, although it did refer to the USSR as "a
federated state, formed on the basis of the voluntary association of...
Soviet Socialist Republics.... ",123 Power was again concentrated in the
central government, with the additional proviso that "[i]n the event of a
discrepancy between a law of a Union Republic and the law of the Union,
the all-Union law prevails." 124 Moreover, whereas in 1924, the authority
of the union was limited to "[eistablishment of basic principles for the
...procedure of the courts and the civil and criminal legislation," 125 in
1936, the union was to enact the detailed legislation. 126 After Stalin's
death, the adoption of codes was referred back to the republics, allowing
for minor variations based on ethnic differences in family composition,
climatic conditions, architectural tradition, urban versus rural settle-
ment, and "national peculiarities." 127
In 1936, two additional central Asian republics (Kirghizia and Kaza-
khstan) were carved out of RSFSR territory with no pretense that they had
a prior existence as independent states. 128 The Transcaucasian Republic
dissolved into its Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaidzhani parts which
were recorded in article 13 as separate republics, for a total of eleven
states (three in the Caucausus, five in Central Asia, plus the RSFSR, Bye-
lorussia, and the Ukraine).129 In 1940, the eleven became sixteen, as ter-
ritorial expansion sovietised Moldavia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and
120. KONSTITrTSIIA (Constitution) of 1924, § 2, art. 2, reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1, at 20.
121. KONSTITutrsuA (Constitution) of 1924, § 1, reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1, at 18.
122. KoNsrlTtrrsnA (Constitution) of 1924, § 2, art. 2, reprinted in TRISKA, supra note I, at 20.
123. KO STITUTsnA (Constitution) of 1936, ch. 2, art. 13, reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1, at
38.
124. KoNSTTUtrsnHA (Constitution) of 1936, ch. 2, art. 20, reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1, at
40.
125. KONSTITUTSIIA (Constitution) of 1924, § 1, art. I (a), reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1. at
19.
126. KONSTITUTSIIA (Constitution) of 1936, ch. 2, art. 14 (u), reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1. at
40.
127. See Y. FLEISHITS & A. MAKOVSKY, THE CIVIL CODES OF THE SovIEr REPUBLICS, 1-33 (1976).
See also Law of the USSR, December 25, 1958, which referred code-making back to the republics.
128. KONSTITUTSA (Constitution) of 1936, ch. 2, art. 13, reprinted in TRISKA. supra note 1, at
38-39.
129. Id.
524
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Karelia. Article 13 was amended to embrace all sixteen republics, 130
albeit political consolidation awaited liberation of the occupied territories
in 1944-45. The Karelo-Finnish Republic, whose population had dropped
well below the one million mark, was absorbed into RSFSR in July of
1956, and became the Karelian Autonomous Republic. Since then, the
number of republics has remained fixed at fifteen. 131
In the 1977 Constitution, union legislative power is unbounded.
Whereas the constitutions of 1924 and 1936 recited specific union pow-
ers, much like the Canadian, Australian, and the United States Constitu-
tions, 132 the Constitution of 1977 simply extends union authority to "the
ensurance of uniformity of legislative norms throughout the USSR and
establishment of the fundamentals of the legislation of the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics and Union Republics."' 133 In other words, any
republican code must conform with its respective union fundament, be it
substantive civil or criminal law, or civil or criminal procedure. 134 In ad-
dition to formulating fundamental principles, the union also has power to
legislate in specific areas. This is implicit in article 74, which declares
that "[i]n the event of a discrepancy between a Union Republic law and
an All-Union law, the law of the USSR shall prevail."1 35
130. KONYTIrUTSInA (Constitution) of 1936, amend, to art. 13, reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1,
at 54.
131. The fifteen republics are recorded in the amended 1936 Constitution and the 1977 Constitu-
tion in the following order: Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azer-
boudzhan, Lithuania, Moldavia, Latvia, Kirghizia, Tadzhikstan, Armenia, Turkemenia, and Esto-
nia. KoNsrrrursuA, supra note 24, art. 71; KoNsTrmUtrsIA (Constitution) of 1936, art. 13, reprinted in
TRiusKA, supra note 1, at 38-39, 54.
132. KoNsrrrursim (Constitution) of 1936, ch. 2, art. 14, reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1, at
39-40; KONST1nIsA (Constitution) of 1924, § 2, art. 1, reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1, at 18-20.
133. KoNsrrrsrslA, supra note 24, art. 73 (4).
134. The British notion of "repugnancy" may be relevant in explaining the relationship of
Union "fundamental" law to republican code law. The doctrine of repugnancy operated to invalidate
colonial laws which conflicted with British law in the area which extended to the colony. For exam-
ple, the New Zealand General Assembly was authorized, by § 53 of the New Zealand Constitution
Act of 1852, supra note 108, to pass laws for the peace, order, and good government of New Zea-
land, so long as such laws were not repugnant to British laws which extended to the colony. If a
British statute, then, declared a 50 hour working week for bakers, a New Zealand statute which
purported to raise that limit to 60 hours per week would presumably be void. But what about a New
Zealand statute which set a 40 hour working week for bakers? The New Zealand court in the first
instance would be obliged to consider the common law mischief which the statute was designed to
remedy. If the statute was designed to protect the health of bakers against working long hours in bad
conditions, then the British statute only set a maximum and the New Zealand statute would be intra
vires. If, on the other hand, the British statute was part of a code to control all aspects of the econ-
omy, including wages, prices, and hours, it would have set both a maximum and a minimum and the
New Zealand law would be void.
The British repugnancy doctrine is closely analogous to the familiar American doctrine of federal
preemption in cases where state and federal law overlap.
135. KoNsrrntrsnA, supra note 24, art. 74.
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Union control of the economy is total under the 1977 Constitution. Ar-
ticle 73 expressly grants to the union "direction of the country's econ-
omy," control of a uniform economic policy, drafting of economic plans,
"determination of... general measures for rational exploitation and con-
servation of natural resources . . . management of a single monetary and
credit system . . . determination of the taxes and revenues . . . formula-
tion of prices and wages policy," and direction of enterprises and indus-
try. 136 In addition to conferring upon the central government complete
control over the domestic economy, article 73 grants the union exclusive
power over foreign trade and external economic activity.
Union constitutional preeminence is complete. The union ensures that
republican constitutions conform to the union Constitution, which in-
cludes the power of interpretation. 137 If necessary, the Constitution can
be amended by a two-thirds vote of the union legislature, the Supreme
Soviet, with no reference back to the republican governments. 138
Union supervision of institutions is unqualified. The Supreme Court of
the USSR supervises the administration of justice in the Union Repub-
lics. 139 The Procurator-General of the union appoints, or confirms the
appointment of all republican, district, and city procurators 140 and they
remain "subordinate solely to the Procurator-General of the USSR,' 14 1
exercising their powers independently of any republican control. The
Council of Ministers of a union republic must execute the legislative acts,
decisions, and ordinances of the union legislature and the union Council
of Ministers. 142
Union direction of the uniformed forces is unilateral and unrestrained.
Article 73 (clauses 8 and 9) expressly grants sole authority for internal
state security, safeguarding of frontiers, organization of defense, and di-
rection of the armed forces to the union.
A further monolithic shadow was cast on the union republics by article
136. Id., art. 73. The 1936 Constitution, as amended by the Fifth Session of the Sixth Supreme
Soviet of the USSR, contained extensive lists of union industrial ministries and union-republican
industrial ministries. KoNsrITrsuA (Constitution) of 1936, arts. 77 & 78, reprinted in TRISKA, supra
note 1, at 69. Under article 73 of the new Constitution, such industrial control is to be allocated by
union statute.
137. KoNsImUrsHA, supra note 24, arts. 137, 143 & 173.
138. KONsTITtrr5sA, supra note 24, art. 173. Statutes are always passed unanimously by the Su-
preme Soviet. Judicial review is not likely to evolve when every statute meets the technical require-
ments of a constitutional amendment. For an example of unchallenged, unconstitutional executive
behavior, see V. CHALIDZE, To DEFEND THESE RtGHTs 20 (1974).
139. KONsr[TUTSIlA, supra note 24, art. 153. Forum shopping is unknown in the Soviet Union,
and Soviet law students do not pursue courses in domestic conflicts of laws.
140. Id. art. 166.
141. Id. art. 168.
142. Id. art. 140.
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75, which states that "[t]he sovereignty of the USSR extends throughout
its territory ... [which] is a single entity and [which] comprises the terri-
tories of the Union Republics." 143
Nonetheless, the Soviet republics are expressly given "the right freely
to secede from the USSR"'144 and the right to conduct their own foreign
relations. 145 These republican rights, as expounded in Soviet texts, are
twin pillars of republican sovereignty. The object here is to determine the
actual nature of Soviet federalism. Are the powers expressly granted to
the union in article 73 undermined by the "nullification" or "states'
rights" effect of article 72, the right freely to secede? Is the USSR a loose
federation of "sovereign Soviet Socialist States"? Is it a true federal sys-
tem with protected congeries of power residing in both the union and the
republics? Or is it a pseudo-federal state with a republican facade
concealing a monolithic centralism?
C. The Validity of Soviet Federalism
1. Marxist-Leninist Theory
The practice of federalism is undoubtedly in sharp conflict with pre-
revolutionary Marxist-Leninist theory, which postulated working class
loyalty over bourgeois nationalism, unitary party control, and centralized
administration. 146 The starkest, least compromising, post-revolutionary
manifestation of this centripetal drive is found in the political posture and
writings of Joseph Stalin:
When a life and death struggle is developing between proletarian Russia
and the imperialist Entente, there are only two possible outcomes for the
border regions. Either they go along with Russia...;
Or they go along with the Entente....
There is no third course.
The so-called independence of so-called Georgia, Armenia, Poland, Fin-
land, etc., is only an illusion, and conceals the utter dependence of these
apologies for States on one or another group of imperialists. 147
143. Id. art. 75.
144. Id. art. 72.
145. Id. art. 80.
146. Engels was uncompromising: "In my opinion the proletariat can only use the form of a
united and indivisible republic." Engels, Zur Kritik des Sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfs
1891, in 22 MARx-ENGELS WERKE 235 (1959), translated and quoted in Uibopuu, Soviet Federalism
under the New Soviet Constitution, 5 REv. Soc. L. 171, 172 (1979).
147. J. Stalin, The Policy of Soviet Power Regarding the National Question in Russia, Pravda,
Oct. 10, 1920, and 4 SOCHINENHA (Works) 353 (1947), translated and quoted in SoviEr NATIONALrrEs
PoLIcY N PrAcnce 23 (R. Conquest ed. 1967).
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His views were sharpened at the 12th Party Congress in April, 1923, in
a debate on the formation of the Transcaucasian Republic, which Stalin
favored and Lenin opposed:
We are told that we must not offend the non-Russian nationalities. That is
perfectly true; I agree that we must not offend them .... Nevertheless it is
clear that the political basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat is primarily
and chiefly the central, industrial regions and not the border regions, which
are peasant countries. If we exaggerate the importance of the peasant border
regions, to the detriment of the proletarian districts, it may result in a crack
in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat .... There are cases when
the right of self-determination conflicts with another, a higher right-the
right of the working class that has come to power to consolidate its power.
In such cases-this must be said bluntly-the right of self-determination
cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the working class in exercising
its right to dictatorship. 148
Stalin repeated this argument, opposing the independence of any small
socialist state, in 1936 saying that "the imperialist beasts of prey would
soon grab [a small socialist state]." 149
It may well be Stalin's greatest (if not only) contribution to Marxist-
Leninist theory to allow and encourage constitutional federalism and na-
tional autonomy while simultaneously neutralizing real power sharing by
means of absolute unitary party discipline. The Soviet dialectic of legal
norms and party power again appears to be in operation, and casts doubt
on the validity of the Soviet Union's alleged federalist structure.
2. The Vocabulary of Soviet Federalism
In Brezhnev's speech introducing the 1977 Constitution, he quoted
from article 70 and defined the USSR as a "unitary, federal, multina-
tional state. " 150 "Unitary" is an English rendering of the Russian word
yedinoye-from the word for "one"-which can be translated as "inte-
gral"-denoting the absence of multiplicity or subdivisions. "Federal"
is from the Russian word soyuznoye, the adjectival form of soyuz, or
"union," perhaps best refidered as "composite." Like other dialectical
phrases, such as "democratic centralism," "socialist reality" (in litera-
ture), and "socialist legality," "unitary federalism" is a self-contained
contradiction. Brezhnev explained that:
148. J. STALIN, 5 SOCHINENIIA (Works) 264-65 (1947), translated and quoted in SovIET NATIONAL-
ITIFS POLICY IN PRACTICE 35-36, 40 (R. Conquest ed. 1967).
149. J. STALIN, ONTHEDRAFTCONSTITUTIONOFTHEU.S.S.R., 37 (1936).
150. Brezhnev's Speech. supra note 12, at 8.
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[T]he progressive drawing together of the USSR's nations and nationali-
ties has prompted a need to strengthen the state's federal principles. This
has been reflected in the definition of the USSR [in article 70]....
[The draft] ensures the all-round flourishing and continued drawing to-
gether of all nations and nationalities in our country....
[It] reflects the new stage in the development of our national economy. It
indicates that the USSR's economy has become a single national-economic
complex that embraces all elements of social production, distribution and
exchange in the country's territory.1 51
His interpretation of "unitary federalism" thus leans toward the centralist
thesis and undermines the federalist claim. 152
3. Citizenship
No fourteenth amendment was necessary in the Soviet Union to clarify
and guarantee federal citizenship. By article 7 of the 1924 constitution,
federal citizenship in the union "replaced" the citizenships of "the sev-
eral constituent Republics." ' 153 In 1936, it was declared that "[s]ingle
Union citizenship is established for all citizens of the U.S.S.R."' 154 and
that "[e]very citizen of a Union Republic is a citizen of the U.S.S.R.'" 155
In addition, the Supreme Soviet of the union was granted express author-
ity to pass "[1]aws governing citizenship of the Union."' 156 The 1977
Constitution maintained federal control, repeated the language of the
1936 constitution concerning single union citizenship, 157 and anticipated
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. Article 71 of the 1977 Constitution lists the fifteen member republics, with the prefatory
phrase "the USSR unites," using the verb obyedinyatsya (also from the noun meaning "one") which
denotes limited union, perhaps best translated as "amalgamated" or "confederated." The Soviet
term for "United Nations" uses a participial for obyedinyatsya, while "United States" is expressed
in Russian with the much stronger soyedinyatsya. By article 71, the Soviet Union more resembles the
United Nations than the United States. On the other hand, the slogan of the Soviet Union urges
"soyedinyatsya" in "Workers of the World, Unite." KoNsTrTrsA, supra note 24, art. 169; KONsTI-
rtrsiIA (Constitution) of 1936, art. 143, reprinted in TRisKA, supra note 1, at 53.
153. KoNsrtnursnA (Constitution) of 1924, §2, art. 2, reprinted in TRIsKA, supra note 1, at 20.
154. KoNsrrrutrsIA (Constitution) of 1924, ch. 2, art. 21, reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1, at
40.
155. Id.
156. KoNSrrrTrs= A (Constitution) of 1936, ch. 2, art. 14 (v), reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1, at
40. For a discussion of citizenship under the 1936 Constitution and the Union Citizenship Statute of
August 19, 1938, see A. VYsHINsKY, THE LAw OF THE SoviEr STATE 290-93 (1948). "At the basis of
the Soviet system of citizenship lie the principles of the internationalism and unity of the Soviet
Union State [expressed in] Article 21 of the USSR Constitution. . . [which characterizes] the actual
unity of the socialist union state." Id. at 290-91.
157. KosTrrursmtA (Constitution), supra note 24, art. 33.
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an all-union citizenship law, controlling grounds for acquisition, forfei-
ture, and renunciation of Soviet citizenship. 158
Neither the Constitution nor the union citizenship statute of 1979
makes provision for republican citizenship. The only evidences of repub-
lican citizenship, according to one writer, are the occasional naturaliza-
tion decrees published in Lithuania and Estonia. 159 Unlike other areas
(land, water resources, public health, labor, the judicial system, succes-
sion, torts, contract, criminal law, criminal procedure, corrective labor,
marriage, family, and education), where the union publishes fundamental
principles and leaves code details to the republics, the 1979 citizenship
statute amounts to a union code.
The republican constitutions uniformly express the following norm:
"Every citizen of Republic (X) is a citizen of the USSR. Citizens of all
other Union Republics enjoy on the territory of X Republic equal rights
with citizens of Republic (X). ' ' 160 Even the republican criminal codes
define treason, and other crimes against the state, such as smuggling,
draft evasion, illegal entry or exit, and counterfeiting, in terms of the
USSR, not the republic, much like treason in a 19th century British col-
ony.16 1
158. Id. arts. 33 & 121 (10). The new law was adopted by the Supreme Soviet on December 1.
1978 to become effective (and replace the old law of August 19, 1938) on July 1. 1979. CURREr
DIGESTOFTHESOVIET PRESS, Jan. 10 1979, at 11. Article 26 of the statute provides that renunciation of
citizenship may only be accepted or authorized by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Id. at 14.
Further, article 17 provides that "[rlenunciation of USSR citizenship may be refused if the person
applying for renunciation has unfulfilled obligations to the state or property obligation involving the
essential interests of citizens or of state, cooperative and other public organizations." Id. at 13.
Renunciation must be refused if the person applying "has had charges brought against him, if a
court sentence against him has taken legal effect and is subject to enforcement, or if the person's
renunciation of USSR citizenship is at variance with the interests of the USSR's state security." Id.
See also Ginsburgs, The New Soviet Citizenship Law and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 33 CHRONICLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE USSR 47 (January-March 1979); Chalidze, The Right
ofa Convicted Citizen to Leave his Country, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 1 (1973).
The comparative British doctrine, the antecedent of all emigration law, is found in the ancient
prerogative writ of ne exeat regno, recorded in Chapter 44 of Magna Charta, and revived unsuccess-
fully in New Zealand in 1970 in an attempt to prevent the New Zealand rugby football team from
touring South Africa and Rhodesia. Parsons v. Burke [19711 N.Z.L.R. 244.
159. Uibopuu, International Legal Personality of Union Republics of U.S.S.R, 24 IN'r'L & CoSP.
L. Q. 811,814 (1975).
160. E.g., Constitution of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic of 1937, art. 18, reprinted in
H. COLLINS, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 16 CONSTITUENT OR UNION REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R. (1950).
The homogeneity of the fifteen republican constitutions is demonstrated by their uniform ordering:
the citizenship clause is article 17 in the Armenian, Moldavian, Tadzhik, and Uzbek constitutions.
and article 18 in the eleven republican constitutions.
161. The crime of treason predates the modem concept of state citizenship-rather than a crime
against the state, treason was a violation of the allegiance owed the ruler by the subject. New Zea-
land's Crimes Act of 1908, for example, defined treason against His Majesty in ten paragraphs. only
one of which related to New Zealand. Crimes Act 1908, § 94, 3 N. Z. STAT. REPR. 285-86 (1958). (It
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Documentary attestation of USSR citizenship makes no express refer-
ence to republican citizenship. The data expressly required includes
name, date and place of birth, and "nationality" (which refers to ethnic
or racial group, not republic). 162 The passport must be made out in the
Russian language in every case, and (if not in the RSFSR) the language of
the union republic, and if necessary (even if in the RSFSR) in the lan-
guage of the relevant autonomous republic. A passport for a resident of
the Abkhasian Autonomous Republic in the Georgian Republic would,
therefore, be made out in Russian, Georgian and Abkhasian. 163
Thus the ligamen which characterizes an inhabitant of the USSR is ob-
ligation to the government of the Soviet Union. Like a British subject
anywhere in the 19th century Empire, the Soviet citizen's primary alle-
giance is due the authority at the center, not the administrator of the re-
gion. The 19th century inhabitant of New Zealand, Canada, Australia,
Wales, or India was a British subject, and could go anywhere in the realm
without legal re-categorization. So it is with the Soviet man or woman.
He or she is primarily a Soviet subject and secondarily a republican citi-
zen.
4. Russian Predominance
"Consequently to Russify the aliens, there is a means,-to breed as many
children as possible."
-Koznyshev, in Anna Karenina, by Leo Tolstoy 164
Common western usage, in both formal and casual communication,
employs "Russian" interchangeably with "Soviet," and "Russia" inter-
changeably with "Soviet Union." '165 Such indulgence is inexcusable in
was, for example, a capital offense for a New Zealander to seduce the wife of the Crown Prince, or
heir-apparent. Id. § 94(i).
A Soviet citizen's allegiance is to the central government, not his republic. For a detailed critique
of the Soviet citizenship law, see Ginsburgs, supra note 158, at 47-53. See also the exhaustive collec-
tion of documents in Volume 7 of Sovurr STATUTES AND DECISIONS.
162. See Regulations Concerning the Passport System in the USSR, resolved by the USSR
Council of Ministers to take effect January 1, 1976, reprinted in INSTITtrEON SOCIAUST LAW, PAPERS ON
SoviErLAw, No. 1 173-87 (L. Lipson & V. Chalidze eds. 1972).
163. Id.
164. L. ToLSToy, ANNA KARENINA, translated in 10 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF COuNTToLsroY 227
(L. Werner trans. 1904).
165. Perpetrators include the western sports announcer who refers to Georgian weightlifters, Ar-
menian boxers, and Uzbek wrestlers as "Russian." (Of course, it is difficult to identify correctly
Central Asian nationals with Russian-Asian sounding surnames, or Russian nationals born and resi-
dent in a non-Russian republic. Naturally, the internal passport records nationality.) At the other end
of the communications spectrum, social science indices, such as the Reader's Guide to Periodic
Literature, file entries on the Soviet Union under "Russia." Well written articles in carefully edited
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strict constitutional analysis, 166 but may be explicable in terms of a de-
scriptive review of certain objective criteria. This section examines the
extent of Russian influence within the Soviet federal system. The federal
equality of the fifteen Soviet Republics is severely impaired by factors
which create a presumptive Russian predominance over the remaining
fourteen republics.
a. Geography and Demography
A cursory glance at a globe demonstrates the overwhelming transconti-
nental Euro-Asian bulk of the RSFSR.167 No other federal unit so devi-
ates from a statistical federal mean, in both population and surface area,
as does the RSFSR. To take Alaska as an example, the largest unit in the
United States is approximately 550 times larger than Rhode Island (the
smallest), a ratio similar to the relation between the RSFSR and Ar-
menia. 168 The parallel, however, goes no further, as Alaska's population
is approximately one-third that of Rhode Island, while the population of
the RSFSR is sixty times that of Armenia. Furthermore, Alaska is only
one-sixth of the United States. surface area, while the RSFSR embraces a
full three-quarters of the USSR. To span the Soviet continental mass is to
travel across the RSFSR, "from sea to shining sea"--to visit the other
republics is to make difficult connections to reach far comers. It can be
argued that Ontario and New South Wales are primus inter pares in the
Dominion of Canada and Commonwealth of Australia, respectively, but
both are in smaller federal systems (ten and six subunits respectively),
their population shares are preeminent, but not predominant, and in each
system there is an effective counterweight (Quebec and Victoria, respec-
tively).
The RSFSR dominates the Soviet Union, in area and in population, to
journals employ the same device. See A Konstitution, 224 NATION 741 (1977). And consider the titles
of scholarly works, including I. LEDERER, RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY (1962); D. TREADOOLD, TWETIETH
CENTURY RUSSIA (3d ed. 1972); R. KAISER, RUSSIA: THE PEOPLE AND THE POWER (1976); H. SmrnI, THE
RUSSIANS (1976).
166. Compare the use of "England" for "United Kingdom" or "Great Britian." Such usage
may be defended as the figure of speech known as synecdoche, or substitution of the part for the
whole. Compare also the use of "America" for "United States of America."
167. A hypothetical North American analogy might be the following: the fifteen American colo-
nies (including upper and lower Canada) are centered around English-speaking Virginia, the epi-
center of the rebellion. The southernmost colonies are Spanish in origin, and the northern colonies
speak Dutch, French, and Iroquois. The capital of the new union is Richmond, Virginia. The trans-
Appalachian claims of the State of Virginia are perfected and expanded all the way across the conti-
nent, so that only Virginia reaches the Pacific, excepting a few Spanish-speaking states in the south-
west.
168. The chart below sets out the statistical relationship of the largest and most populous state or
province to its federal union:
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an extent unrivaled, or even remotely approximated, by any state or prov-
ince in any comparable federal system. This domination is prima facie
evidence of similar political preponderance in violation of Soviet consti-
tutional norms.
b. CapitalArea
The capital city or territory of an animated federal system will be either
located in a neutral zone, or its location will be a contentious political
issue. The United States and Australia have neutral capital districts, be-
yond state jurisdiction, achieved only by hard-driven political compro-
mise and pragmatic bargaining. 169 In Canada, on the other hand, an his-
Number Square % of % of
State of Units Miles Whole Population Whole
USSR 15 8,599,341 100 248,626,000 100
RSFSR (largest and
most populous) 6,593,850 76.6 132,151,000 53.3
Australia 6 2,967,909 '100 13,130,000 100
Western Australia
(largest) 975,920 32.9 1,084,000 8.2
New South Wales
(most populous) 309,433 10.4 4,738,000 36.1
Canada 10 3,851,809 100 22,130,000 100
Quebec (largest) 594,860 15.4 6,081,000 27.0
Ontario
(most populous) 412,582 10.7 7,939,000 35.9
USA 50 3,615,123 100 211,390,000 100
Alaska (largest) 586,412 16.2 337,000 .16
California
(most populous) 158,693 4.4 20,907,000 9.9
The statistics, for the sake of uniformity, are all taken from BARTHOLOMEW (JOHN) AND SON, LTD., THE
TIMEs ATLAs OF THE WORLD (1975). The populations figures were taken from 1973 or 1974 and are
given here for comparative purposes only. More recent statistics are available in the annual Statistical
Yearbook (Annuaire Statistique) published by the United Nations, and in the Statistical Abstract of
the US, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce,Bureau of Census.
169. Australians agreed that their federal capital could not remain at Melbourne or Sydney, the
leading candidates in Victoria and New South Wales, respectively-just as Americans agreed that the
union capital could not repose in Philadelphia or New York. The Australian constitution provided:
The Seat of Government of the Commonwealth shall be determined by the Parliament, and
shall be within territory which shall have been granted to or acquired by the Commonwealth,
and shall be vested in and belong to the Commonwealth, and shall be in the State of South Wales
and be distant not less than one hundred miles from Sydney ...
The Parliament shall sit at Melbourne until it meet at the Seat of Government.
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 63 & 64 Vict. ch. 12, 1900, § 125. See also the Seat
of Government Act (1908-1973) (Australia), the Seat of Government (Administration) Act
1910-1973 (Australia), and the Australian Capitol Territory Representation (House of Representa-
tives) Act 1973 (Australia).
The location of the capitol of the U.S. on the banks of the Potomac was apparently a political quid
pro quo for Virginia's support of Hamilton's plan for national assumption of preconstitutional debts.
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torical anachronism survives, and Canada's capital city (Ottawa) remains
wholly within the province and legal jurisdiction of Ontario. Three fac-
tors mitigate this anamoly: (1) the provincial governors reside in a differ-
ent city (Toronto) some distance away, and there is no room for the fed-
eral reins of power to be taken in provincial hands; (2) the capital city,
Ottawa, is located on the provincial border, and a substantial Francophone
city is directly across the border (the Ottawa River); and (3) the Canadian
Parliament recognizes the inequity symbolized by the location of the capi-
tal, and a National Capitol Act has established a planning and zoning
commission for an 1,800 square mile area in Ontario and Quebec. A Spe-
cial Joint Committee of the Senate and House on the Constitution of Can-
ada has recommended that "there should be a movement by stages to-
wards the possible creation of an autonomous Canadian Capitol."1 70 The
committee came to its conclusion after making this finding of policy: "A
country's capitol is an essential instrument of national pride. In a federal,
bilingual and multicultural country, it must also be an essential instru-
ment of national unity." 171
These Canadian conclusions can be applied to the Soviet experience.
The capital city of the USSR, of course, is the ancient Russian Moscovy,
or Moskva, at once the union capital, the republican capital, and the
CPSU headquarters. The laws of the city are those of the Russian repub-
lic, to the extent that they differ from those of the union. The language of
the capital is, of course, Russian. It became the capital of the RSFSR
immediately upon the Revolution, and has been the only union capital, as
the union expanded from four republics to sixteen. It became the capital
before the Baltic and Central Asian republics came into Union existence
See W. B. BRYAN, I A HISTORY OFTHE NATIONAL CAPITOL 1-43 (1914).
Consider also the selection of Bonn as the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany.
170. FINAL REPORTOFTHE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITEEOFTHE SENATE AND OFTHE HOUSEOF COMNISONSON
THE CONSTrrUTION OF CANADA, 28th Parl. 4th Sess. (1972). See Chapter 16, "The National Capitol
Area," which said:
[A country's capital] must reflect equitably all aspects of that country's character, and each
citizen should have a true sense of ownership in the capital of his country regardless of the
distance which separates him from the seat of government.
In Canada this has not been and is not now the case. Ottawa was chosen as capital [See
Section 16 of the British North American Act 1857 (U.K.): "Until the Queen otherwise directs,
the seat of Government of Canada shall be Ottawa"] at a time when the Western Provinces did
not exist and Canada had only two of its Atlantic Provinces. It was not granted territorial auton-
omy, but was situated on the territory of one central Province in close proximity to the other.
As Canada grew, so did its Capital, but it did so reflecting the character and the flavour of the
Province of which it was a part and on which it was dependent, to the exclusion of the many
other characteristics which were already present in, or which were steadily being added to, the
fabric of Canada. The absence of a truly bilingual character is particularly marked.
Id. at41.
171. FINAL REPORT, supra note 170.
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and thus can hardly be said to partake equally of the "character and fla-
vour" of the non-Russian republics.
A recent Soviet constitutional critique noted that "the fact that the cap-
itals of the USSR and RSFSR coincide strengthens the predominant role
of the RSFSR in the Union."1 72 At the same time, it undermines the norm
of republican equality and the assertion of a viable federalist system.
c. Russian Language and Soviet Symbols
The Brezhnev Constitution of 1977 guarantees the right to use a non-
Russian, national language, 173 prohibits discrimination based on nation-
ality or language,174 and requires that judicial proceedings be conducted
in the appropriate republican language. 175 These constitutional protec-
tions have not always been reflected in legal practice. A 1922 Decree,
paradoxically called "Expanding the Use of the Tatar Language," pro-
hibited private telephone conversations in the Tatar language, "by virtue
of the impossibility of establishing monitoring." 176 In the late twenties
the Soviets began a linguistic attack on Islam by eliminating Arabic
script-the alphabet of the Koran-and substituting the Latin alphabet in
Central Asia. 177 Another tack toward Russification was taken in
1938-40, when the Latin alphabet was in turn replaced by the Russian
alphabet in the Central Asian republics, Azerbaidzhan, the Tatar Autono-
mous Republic, and the Crimea. 178 This shift was justified on the grounds
that Russian loan words could be introduced into these languages more
easily, and that the study of the Russian language itself would be made
easier. 179 On March 13, 1938, the study of the Russian language became
compulsory in non-Russian schools everywhere in the Union. 180 For five
172. A. Volpin, On the Constitution of the USSR, PAPERS ON SoviEr LAW 52, 106 (L. Lipson &
V. Chalidze eds. 1977).
The USSR should create an extra-republican capital territory outside the jurisdiction of the RSFSR.
The most appropriate region might be the southeastern comer of Byelorussia, near Gomel, the tricor-
nered area where the borders of Russia, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia are contiguous. The nearest
settlement to these borders is known, happily enough, as Lenino.
173. KoNsrTITrsIIA, supra note 24, art. 36.
174. Id., art. 34.
175. Id., art. 159.
176. The Decree of the Central Executive Committee Area Council of People's Commissars of
the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on Expanding the Use of the Tatar Language,
cited in CHAUDzE, To DEFND THESE Rrrrs 87 (1974).
177. See SoviEr NATIONALMES POLICY IN PRACnCE 70-78 (R. Conquest ed. 1967).
178. See id. at 75.
179. See id.
180. See id.
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years-between 1960 and 1965-statutes and regulations were published
only in Russian. 181
The preeminence of the Russian language can be characterized as Great
Russian linguistic imperialism, benign westernization and socialization of
feudal states, or the inevitable use of the only possible lingua franca in
scientific institutions, the military, major industrial enterprises, educa-
tional facilities, and trade union centers. Such preeminence does exist,
however, and constitutional protections are of no avail where de facto
discrimination against non-Russian speakers limits opportunity. As a So-
viet authority recently wrote: "Every Soviet citizen, while making wide
use of his native tongue, strives to satisfy his need for knowledge of Rus-
sian ... [but] the desire that peoples of the USSR have to master the
Russian language is depicted as a threat to other languages." 182
Several symbols receive constitutional sanctification in the 1977 Con-
stitution, and Russification is evident here as well. A Soviet seal is speci-
fied as "a hammer and sickle on a globe depicted in the rays of the sun
and framed by ears of wheat with the inscription 'Workers of All Coun-
tries, Unite!' in the languages of the Union Republics."' 183 The Russian
language inscription occupies central position, in large type, framed by
folds of red ribbon and flanked by Ukrainian and Byelorussian; the other
twelve languages radiate upward in smaller type on either side of the Rus-
sian center piece. 184
The 1977 Constitution provides for a State Anthem to be confirmed by
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. 185 The most recent lyrics were ap-
proved on May 27, 1977, and appeared, with score, in Izvestia of June
12, 1977, emphasizing the formation of the Union:
"Great Russia has united forever
An unbreakable union offree republics.
Long live the indivisible mighty Soviet Union,
Created by the will of the peoples. "186
Song writers may of course be granted artistic license, but an indivisible,
181. See id. at 78.
182. Bagramov, Relations Among Nationalities and the Struggle of ldeas, CURRENT DIGEST OF THE
SoviEr PREss, Aug. 22, 1979, at 12.
183. KONsTITUSIIA, supra note 24, art. 169.
184. Soviet symbolism is extensively discussed in 8 SovIEr STATUTES AND DECIsIoNs 13-410
(1971-72). See particularly Smith, Soviet State Symbolism, in 8 SovIET STATurUEs AND DECISIONS
26-42, for a demonstration of the similarity between the seal of the Russian Empire and the seal of
the Soviet Union.
185. KONsTITUTSIA, supra note 24, art. 171.
186. See CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SovIET PRESS, July 13, 1977, at 10. The Russian words for
"united," "unbreakable," and "indivisible" are splotit, nerushimi, and yedini, respectively.
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unbreakable union united (not amalgamated or federated) by Great Russia
does not comport with constitutional norms. 187
5. Military Capacity
The 1924 constitution allocated armed forces "organization and con-
trol" to the Union, 188 but left open the possibility that republics might
have their own formations. The Third Congress of Soviets (of the 1924
constitution) approved a plan for national units, and by 1934, there were
seventeen non-Great Russian divisions in the Red Army-ten Ukrainian,
three Byelorussian, two Georgian, one Armenian, and one Azerbaid-
zhani. The Stalin (1936) constitution, however, assigned "[o]rganization
of the defense of the U.S.S.R. and the direction of all the armed forces of
the U.S.S.R." to the Union, 189 and in the last party Congress before the
war, in 1939, it was declared that:
The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is the sole army of the Soviet State
on a common and equal basis. For this reason the existence of separate
small national military formations, permanently tied to their own territory,
contradicted the fundamentals of the Stalin Constitution and the principles
of the extra-territorial recruitment of our Army. The national units have
been merged in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army on a common
basis. 190
A political reversal occurred in 1944 (perhaps anticipating republican
membership in the post-war United Nations organization) and a constitu-
tional amendment authorized "republican military formations" 191 under
the organizational control of the relevant republican Supreme Soviet.192
A further amendment gave the union responsibility to formulate "direct-
ing principles" for the "organization of the military formations of the
Union Republics." 193
All such republican powers were stricken from the 1977 Constitution.
Complete authority for (internal) state security, war and peace, safe-
187. KONsTTutrsuIA, supra note 24, arts. 70-81.
188. KoNsmrruTsuA (Constitution) of 1924, §1, art. 1(m), reprinted in TRSiKA, supra note 1, at 19.
189. KONsTIrrrsnA (Constitution) of 1936, ch. 2, art 14(g), reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1, at
39.
190. STENOGRAPHIC ACCOUNT OF 18TH CONGRESS OF ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (Bolsheviks) 191
(1939), reprinted in SoviEr NATIONALITIES POLICY IN PRACTICE 53 (R. Conquest ed. 1967).
191. KONsTrrtursIA (Constitution) of 1936, as amended by the Fifth Session of the Sixth Supreme
Soviet of the USSR, ch. 2, art. 18b, reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1, at 62.
192. KONSTITtSHIA (Constitution) of 1936, as amended by the Fifth Session of the Sixth Supreme
Soviet of the USSR, ch. 4, art. 60(), reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1, at 66.
193. KoNsTrtursuA (Constitution) of 1936, as amended by the Fifth Session of the Sixth Supreme
Soviet of the USSR, ch. 2, art 14 (g), reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1, at 61.
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guarding frontiers and territory, direction of the Armed forces, and orga-
nization of defense was given to the USSR, not the republics.
If a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free State,
then it must be concluded that the Soviet republics are less than free
states. To be sure, neither the Canadian provinces nor the Australian
states have military capacities, but then, neither do they have a constitu-
tional right to secede or conduct foreign relations.194 The lack of a mili-
tary potential further taints the presumption of republican sovereignty.
6. International Legal Personality and the Right to Secede
Soviet authorities have only recently emphasized the international legal
capacity of the republics, introducing constitutional concepts which run
counter to claims of economic interdependence. In his 1936 speech on the
draft constitution of that year, Stalin emphasized "fraternal cooperation"
in a single state, while opposing increased federal rights for administra-
tive units like the Tatar Republic and the Volga German Republic, no-
where mentioning republican capacity to treat with foreign nations. 195 In-
deed, two years before, on September 18, 1934, the Soviet Union joined
the League of Nations as a single entity, leaving no record of having
sought multiple membership. The standard constitutional law text of its
day, A. Y. Vyshinsky, Law of the Soviet State, emphasized that "ques-
tions of external relationships (diplomatic and economic) ... [are left] to
the unlimited jurisdiction of the Union as before [the 1936 constitu-
tion]." 1 96 To demonstrate his thesis, Vyshinsky recorded the communi-
cation of July 23, 1923, when "the government of the USSR informed
foreign powers that it had assumed conduct of the foreign relations of the
Soviet Republics.' ' 97 He also discussed and rejected the federal, or
state's rights, theory of the American Calhoun, whose theory, Vyshinsky
says, "was accepted by the bourgeoisie of the Confederate States which,
194. British North America Act, supra note 97; Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act,
supra note 98.
195. Report delivered by J. Stalin to the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the
U.S.S.R. (Nov. 25, 1936), reprinted in J. STALIN, ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE USSR 16
(1936).
196. A. Y. VYSHINSKY, THE LAW OFTHE SOVIETSTATE 280 (1948).
Vyshinsky was the leading Soviet jurist of his time. He wrote (or perhaps edited) the definitive
work on Soviet constitutional law, edited the leading law review (Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo-
Soviet State and Law), was the chief Prosecutor of the USSR, and personally directed and conducted
the trials of leading old Bolsheviks (Bukharin, Pyatakov, Kamenev, and Radek) in 1937-38. He also
served as deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, as Foreign Minister from 1949 to 1953, and as Soviet
delegate to the U.N. after Stalin's death until his death in 1954.
197. Id. at 107.
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during the Civil War, sought to withdraw from the Northern States."' 198
He sets out the USSR as "protector of the sovereign rights of Union Re-
publics" 199 and describes the "nature of the USSR as a single, union,
socialist state" whose laws are binding upon each Union republic and
have binding force in its territory.' 200
Revision and reversal came on February 1, 1944, when the Soviet Con-
stitution was amended, giving the republics "the right to enter into direct
relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange
diplomatic and consular representatives with them," 201 and declaring that
"Each Union Republic [shall have] its own Republican military forma-
tions."202
This amendment preceded, by six months, the demand for sixteen So-
viet seats in the post-war allied nation's organization (Dumbarton Oaks,
August-October 1944). A few months later, at Yalta (February 1945), the
Soviet request for sixteen places (at that time, the Karelo-Finnish Repub-
lic still existed) was revised downward to three seats, for the Ukraine,
Byelorussia, and Lithuania. One of the participants at Yalta, E. R. Stet-
tinius; the American Secretary of State, recorded various justifications for
the Soviet request advanced by Stalin, Foreign Minister Molotov, and
President Roosevelt. 203
Molotov argued that the constitutional changes of 1944 justified multi-
ple Soviet membership. He also noted that Byelorussia, Lithuania, and
198. Id. at 278 n.60. The essence of Calhoun's theory, "the great and leading principle," which
Vyshinsky rejected, is "that the General Government emanated from the people of the several States,
forming distinct political communities, and acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not
from all of the people forming one aggregate political community; that the Constitution of the United
States is, in fact, a compact, to which each state is a party, in the character already described; and that
the several States, or parties, have a right to judge of its infractions. . . . This right . . . . be it
called what it may,-State-right, veto, nullification, or by any other name,-I conceive to be the
fundamental principle of our system. ... Address by John C. Calhoun (July 26, 1831), reprinted
in WE THE STATES 278-79 (1964) (collection of commentaries published by the Virginia Commission
on Constitutional Government).
Presumably, Vyshinsky rejected the "sovereign capacity" of the republics to nullify or veto Union
Action. The republics had a constitutional power to secede, but this option, assuming it is viable,
embraced no lesser alternative.
199. A. Y. VYSHINSKY, THE LAW oF THE SoviEr STATE 288 (1948). The USSR will protect the
republics, according to Vyshinsky, from the fascist states and the "right-Trotsky bloc" which
"yeam[s] to wrest from the USSR the majority of the Union Republics and turn them into colonies of
their own." Id. at 288-89.
200. Id. at 289.
201. KoNsTrrursHA (Constitution) of 1936, art. 18(a), reprinted in TRISKA, supra note 1 at 54.
202. Id. art. 18(b). Note that article 18(b) does not merely declare a right; it postulates the thing
itself. The republics did not, in fact, have national formations after 1939. It could, of course, be
suggested that a Lithuanian, Latvian, Finnish, Estonian, or Ukranian Army might have been as much
of a threat to Stalin as to Hitler.
203. See E. R. STEMrNIUS, ROOSEvELTANDTHE RussiAs 173 (1950).
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the Ukraine, were heavily populated, and that they had borne the greatest
sacrifice of the war. According to Stettinius, Stalin told F.D.R. that Sta-
lin's position in the Ukraine was "insecure" and a vote for the Ukraine,
ironically, would assist Soviet unity. Roosevelt observed that the British
were themselves embarrassed about multiple votes within the Empire.
Churchill in particular had little standing to protest, as he was opposed to
independence for India, which was expected to gain U.N. membership.
F.D.R. added a pragmatic rationalization by concluding that out of fifty
or more seats in the General Assembly, two, three, or four for the Soviet
Union would make little difference.
An additional reason was advanced after the fact by the Ukrainian For-
eign Minister, Dmitri Maniulsky, who implied in 1945 that when the
other republics have reached a certain level of production and self-suffici-
ency they would also join the U.N. separately. 204 A more cynical expla-
nation was offered by another contemporary diplomat, Sumner Welles,
who suggested that a bargain was struck, in part, because of confusion in
the American camp about regional associations in Latin America, and in
part, to secure the admission of Argentina's pro-German government. 205
Article 2(1) of the Charter of the United Nations proclaims: "the Orga-
nization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Mem-
bers." 206 The Ukraine and Byelorussia (but not Lithuania or the Russian
Republic) joined the USSR in charter signatory membership, and thus
arguably, possessed a degree of sovereignty equal to that of the USSR. In
addition, the Ukraine and Byelorussia have joined many international or-
ganizations, 207 consequent upon their U.N. membership, and, in turn,
become signatories to many multilateral treaties and conventions. 208 The
Ukraine took the lead in advancing the Soviet position in the Dutch-
Indonesian crisis of 1946, and was a member of the Security Council
from January 1, 1948 through December 31, 1949. Recent Soviet consti-
tutional texts, which have replaced Vyshinsky's, emphasize that the re-
publics are independent entities at international law, 209 and routinely cite
204. S. ARNE, UNITED NATIONS PRIMER 134 (1948).
205. S. WELLES, WHERE ARE WE HEADING? 211 (1946). American conservatives believed that a
Communist conspiracy, led by Alger Hiss, was responsible for the multiple Soviet membership. Hiss
had participated in the Yalta Conference and had presided at organizational meetings in San Fran-
cisco; he was subsequently interrogated by the House Un-American Activities Committee concern-
ing his support for the Soviets. See A. WEINSTEIN, PERJURY: THE HISS-CHAMBERS CASE 14, 359 (1978).
See also J. C. SMITH, ALGER HISS: THE TRUE STORY 114-134 (1976).
206. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
207. For a list of these organizations see generally 29 UNITED NATIONS YEARBOOK (1975).
208. Uibopuu, International Legal Personality of Union Republics of U.S.S.R., 24 IWr'L &
CoMP. L. Q. 811, 835 (1975). No bilateral treaty between a western nation and a Soviet Republic is
cited.
209. V. 1. LIsovsKY, MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO (International Law) 68 (1970); 1 KURS MEZHDUNAR-
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their right of secession and the international activity of the Ukraine and
Byelorussia as proof.
Critics writing in the west unanimously reject these claims, citing the
republican failure to pursue meaningful international relations. Dolan
claims that post-war British and American diplomatic approaches to Bye-
lorussia and the Ukraine resulted in "a complete fiasco," 210 and Uibopuu
refers to unanswered British attempts to exchange representatives with
Ukraine. 211 Luryi flatly states that:
It is obvious from even a cursory analysis that the union republics do not
have even partial independence in terms of internal politics and none in
terms of external politics.... On constitutional grounds, there is even less
reason to consider the republics as independent states than states in the
United States or Provinces in Canada. 212
These critics base their conclusions on their empirical observation of
what the republican governments have failed to do, and the absence of
meaningful diplomatic activity by the Ukraine and Byelorussia as well as
the other twelve republics (excluding the RSFSR). Constitutional fraud,
however, is not demonstrated by the failure of, say, Kazakhstan to iden-
tify with a League of Islamic States, but by the anomalous inconsistencies
that do exist. For example, the second and third, but not the most popu-
lous of Soviet republics are represented at the U.N. Does this prove that
the RSFSR is less developed than the Ukraine and Byelorussia, or that the
USSR is really the RSFSR writ large? Are Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia
less developed than the Ukraine? Did the Balkan republics suffer less in
WW II than Byelorussia? Neutral constitutional analysis can accept the
republican powers of the 1977 document and still demonstrate a lack of
genuine international republican capacity.
The republics have no international economic capacity. They cannot
create, subsidize, or otherwise control international exchange of material
goods. They cannot engage in international trade. They cannot raise capi-
tal abroad, extend credit, or otherwise take part in international finance by
ODNOVO PRAVA V. SHESTI TOMAKH (A Course in International Law in Six Volumes) 150 (1967). See
generally D. B. LEvIN, ISTORIYA MMIDUNARODNOVO PRAVA (History of International Law) (1962).
210. Dolan, The Member-Republics of the U.S.S.R. as Subjects of the Law of Nations, 4 INT'L &
CotP. L. Q. 629,631 (1955).
211. Uibopuu quotes official British correspondence:
[I]t is confirmed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, that the British Govern-
ment in August 1947 formally requested the Soviet Government to forward to the Government
of the Ukranian Republic their proposal for an exchange of diplomatic representatives. No reply
was received from the Ukranian Government. ...
Uibopuu, International Legal Personality of Union Republics of U.S.S.R., 24 INT'L & Comp. L. Q.
811, 840n. 165 (1975).
212. Luryi, supra note 58, at 56.
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the terms of article 73(10)-which explains republican non-participation
in the IMF, IDA, IFC and the International Bank. They can participate in
the exchange of information and regulation of intellectual property, but
ironically, they may neither export nor import material goods nor manage
a financial exchange-the very essence of the tasks of a socialist state.
As the 1977 Constitution abolished republican military operations, the
republics lost the von Clausvitzian option to pursue diplomacy by other
means. They can engage in symbolic friendship, but have not the means
to constitutionally resist foreign, or internal, territorial incursions. They
have no control of their own borders, 213 nor even their internal territorial
security. 214 They cannot try a citizen for treason against their own repub-
lic, even if it was possible to identify their own citizenry vis-a-vis citizens
of other republics.
Finally, even the right to secede is an empty vessel, devoid of legal
meaning. There exists no legal means or republican agency capable of
pursuing such a decision, even if the decision could be approached ver-
bally without violating that section of the relevant republican criminal
code, required by the All-Union norm, which proscribes "weakening the
Soviet State" by word or by deed. 215
CONCLUSION
The Soviet federal system is suspect at every level of legal, judicial,
executive, legislative, and administrative activity, and the constitutional
forms of federalism are a facade. The Russia of the Czars, the Great Rus-
sian Empire, has transmuted and is now concealed in Marxist cloth of
Leninist cut, but the fundament of Russian domination remains. Union
legislative power is unbounded, union control of the economy is total,
union constitutional preeminence is complete, union supervision of insti-
tutions is unqualified, and union direction of the armed forces is unilateral
and unrestrained. Marxist-Leninist theory, the vocabulary of Soviet fed-
eralism and the absence of republican citizenship support an interpreta-
tion of Soviet "unitary federalism," which emphasizes the central unit.
The republics have no policy-making authority, either foreign or domes-
tic, and they do not share, in any consistent manner, international legal
personalities. In practice they cannot exercise their power to secede. In
law, the so-called republics have less autonomy than Canadian provinces
or Australian states. It must be concluded that the USSR is a supremely
unitary state, with a superficial federal veneer.
213. KONSTITUTSHIA, supra note 24, art. 73(8).
214. ld. art. 73(9).
215. See, e.g., Criminal Code of RSFSR, art. 70.
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